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Abstract 
 
 
In The Reasons of Love, Harry Frankfurt proposes a philosophical account of love according to which 
there are four necessary conditions for the occurrence of love. We may ask reasonable questions about 
these four conditions: (1) Is each condition adequately analytically defined? (2) Is each condition 
plausibly a necessary condition for love, and has Frankfurt defended their necessity with good 
arguments? (3) Are all four conditions consistent with each other? And (4) if the four conditions are only 
necessary, and hence tell us only when love is absent, what must be added to Frankfurt’s account which 
would tell us, just as importantly, when love is present? In this essay I address these questions, although 
some more than others, especially in trying to understand Frankfurt’s claims about “self-love.” It 
emerges from this investigation that Frankfurt’s central metaethical thesis, which he has been advancing 
for three decades—that caring about or loving something logically precedes valuing it, and hence that we 
cannot have value-mentioning reasons for loving something or someone—starts to fall apart. 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
In his 2004 book The Reasons of Love, Harry Frankfurt proposes a philosophical 
account of love according to which there are four necessary conditions for the 
occurrence of love. We may ask some reasonable questions about these four conditions: 
(1) Is each condition adequately analytically defined? Not altogether, is my answer. (2) 
Is each condition plausibly a necessary condition for love, and has Frankfurt defended 
their necessity with good arguments? No to both, is my answer. (3) Is the set of four 
propositions, each of which claims that one of the conditions is necessary for love, 
satisfiable? No, is my answer. And (4) if the four conditions are only necessary, and 
hence tell us only when love is absent, what must be added to Frankfurt’s account 
which would tell us, just as importantly, when love is present? (After the addition of  
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any nth condition, that expanded set of propositions would have to be tested for 
satisfiability.) In this essay, I address these questions, although some more than others, 
but especially those that are important for assessing Frankfurt’s dramatic claims about 
“self-love.” It emerges from this investigation that Frankfurt’s central thesis, which he 
has been advancing for three decades—that caring about or loving someone or 
something logically precedes valuing it, and hence that value-mentioning reasons for 
loving someone or something are conceptually misguided—starts to fall apart. 
 
 
1. The Thirty-Year Thesis 
 
To comprehend much of what Frankfurt says about love in Reasons of Love, and why 
he says it, we must first engage his most significant claim about caring about, or loving, 
someone or something. In opposition to Plato and Aristotle (and plenty of other 
philosophers, both past and contemporary), Frankfurt believes that caring about or 
loving someone or something is not grounded in reasons provided by the superb 
qualities (i.e., the pre-love perceived value) of the object toward which the care or love 
is directed. Plato thought that a person can love-desire only persons and things that are 
good and beautiful, and Aristotle (Augustine, too) agreed, even if he (and Augustine) 
did not equate love and desire and even if he (and Augustine) placed a stricter limit 
than Plato did on what counts as “goodness” and “beauty.”1 Here is how, in Reasons of 
Love, Frankfurt explains his dissenting position: 
 
It is true that the beloved invariably is, indeed, valuable to the lover. 
However, perceiving that value is not at all an indispensable formative 
or grounding condition of the love. It need not be a perception of value 
in what he loves that moves the lover to love it. The truly essential 
relationship between love and the value of the beloved goes in the 
opposite direction. It is not necessarily as a result of recognizing their 
value and of being captivated by it that we love things [and people]. 
Rather, what we love necessarily acquires value for us because we love 
it. The lover does invariably and necessarily perceive the beloved as 
valuable, but the value he sees it to possess is a value that derives from 
and that depends upon his love.2 
 
Suppose that I perceive Loretta as good and beautiful because I love her and not 
because she is good and beautiful. If so, why do I love her at all? And why do I love her 
instead of Kathleen? Answers to these questions are not obviously or easily 
forthcoming from Frankfurt. Indeed, for Frankfurt, there may be no reasons at all for 
loving someone, and we can love anything. 
 
Frankfurt had asserted this view thirty years ago in “The Importance of What We Care 
About.”3 At that time he wrote, “The person does not care about the object because its 
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worthiness commands that he do so” but “caring about something makes that thing 
important to the person who cares about it.”4 His answer to the question “why love one 
thing rather than another; why love Loretta instead of Kathleen?” is striking: 
 
What makes it more suitable . . . for a person to make one object rather 
than another important to himself? It seems that it must be the fact that it 
is possible for him to care about the one and not about the other, or to 
care about the one in a way which is more important to him than the way 
in which it is possible for him to care about the other.5 
 
That we are able (logically? psychologically? logistically?) to care about something or 
someone is not much of a test to employ in deciding and coming to care about 
something. It leaves the field wide open. Frankfurt is not moved by this consideration. 
There are, for him, no reasons, good or bad, for loving something or someone. There is 
just love, which itself provides reasons for valuing things and persons and behaving 
accordingly toward them.6 Frankfurt finishes his metaethical project by finally, in 
Reasons, analyzing what love is.7 
 
 
2. The Four Necessary Conditions of Love 
 
Near the end of Reasons, Frankfurt summarizes his account of love: “love for a person 
has four main conceptually necessary features.”8 
 
[I] First, it consists most basically in a disinterested concern for the well-
being or flourishing of the person who is loved. It is not driven by any 
ulterior purpose but seeks the good of the beloved as something that is 
desired for its own sake.9 
 
Let’s call this necessary condition the “disinterested concern” condition. The concern 
of love is not motivated by “any ulterior purpose”; the lover desires and promotes the 
beloved’s good “for its own sake.” Although Frankfurt may be right to include 
disinterested concern, in a sense that is due to or derived from Aristotle or Kant,10 as a 
necessary element of love, one of his applications of this conception of disinterested 
concern (viz., when it is employed to understand “self-love”) turns out to be a major 
mistake in his account of love. 
 
[II] Second, love is . . . ineluctably personal. The lover cannot 
coherently consider some other individual to be an adequate substitute 
for his beloved, regardless of how similar that individual may be to the 
one he loves. The person who is loved is loved for himself or for herself 
as such, and not as an instance of a type. 
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Let’s call this the “particularity” condition. Love, on Frankfurt’s view, is not de dicto 
but de re: a person is loved as a “particular” independently of descriptions that may or 
may not apply to him or her.11 The beloved is not loved (as she is loved, for example, 
according to Plato in the Symposium) for being a describable type of person or as the 
vehicle of superb properties. Hence the beloved is not replaceable (or substitutable) by 
another person who has a similar set of admirable properties (or even a different set).12 
The “love logically precedes judgments of value” thesis is not, in Reasons, a separate 
criterion or necessary condition of love. It either underlies or is included in condition 
[II], in the sense that loving a person de re or as a particular implies not having reasons 
for loving that person that mention his or her valuable attributes. In denying that love is 
de dicto, Frankfurt denies that the lover responds to the beloved qua an instantiation of 
attractive properties. (Whether these properties are unique or instead repeatable, 
actually or in principle, does not matter.) On this Platonic-Aristotelian-Augustinian 
view, caring about something, loving it, or making it important in our lives depends on 
logically prior, independent judgments about its positive value. Further, the selection of 
a beloved made on the basis of good reasons is better, that is, more rational or moral, 
than a choice made on the basis of bad reasons (see ROL, 38-39). The distinction 
between the lovable and the unlovable is grounded in and rationally justified by the 
perception and assessment of the value of potential beloveds—which, for Frankfurt, 
gets everything backwards. 
 
[III] Third, the lover identifies with his beloved: that is, he takes the 
interests of his beloved as his own. Consequently, he benefits or suffers 
depending upon whether those interests are or are not adequately served. 
 
Let’s call this the “identification of interests” condition.13 Taking the interests of the 
beloved as my own promotable interests prima facie fits uneasily with the 
“disinterested concern” condition, according to which I desire to promote the interests 
(the good, well-being, flourishing) of my beloved for her own sake. The “disinterest 
concern” condition also fits uneasily with Frankfurt’s remarks about the significance in 
our lives of love, which is the ultimate ground of value. On his view there are no 
serious problems. Earlier in the book, Frankfurt had devoted a section (ROL, 42-44) to 
laying out three of his necessary conditions, those I have labeled [I], [II], and [IV]. The 
“identification of interests” condition, [III], is treated only a full twenty pages later 
(ROL, 60-62) and seems to be proposed precisely (perhaps entirely) because Frankfurt 
anticipates problems with “disinterested concern.” The move may be logically ad hoc, 
because Frankfurt never defends this condition on any other grounds. At the crucial 
place where he introduces the “identification of interests” condition as his way around 
problems with disinterested concern, he writes only that “in the very nature of the case” 
the lover identifies with the beloved, which seems question-begging. Soon we’ll 
examine the details of the manner in which Frankfurt, by invoking the identity of 
interests, solves problems with disinterested concern. 
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[IV] Finally, loving entails constraints upon the will. It is not simply up 
to us what we love and what we do not love. Love is not a matter of 
choice but is determined by conditions that are outside our immediate 
voluntary control. 
 
I am not sure what this “nonvoluntary” condition amounts to. Does the claim that love 
is “outside our immediate voluntary control” allow that love is not altogether outside 
our control, that “nonimmediate” and not “simple” measures might be chosen to 
influence what or whom we love or the fashion in which we love?14 Frankfurt concedes 
that we can “indirectly” exert control over our loves (ROL, 49). If so, his claims about 
“constraints” and “determined” are overstated. This point is important for his thirty-
year thesis, for to the extent that Frankfurt countenances a genuine even if only partial 
choice of whom to love, this concession energizes the specter of loving someone as a 
describable type and undermines his thesis that value-based reasons for love are beside 
the point. 
 
None of Frankfurt’s necessary conditions originates with him. His contribution to the 
philosophy of love consists merely of soldering these four features together as the 
conceptually necessary features of love.15 Gabrielle Lear surprisingly and implausibly 
opines that Frankfurt’s four conditions are “relatively uncontroversial.”16 (Perhaps in 
Chicago they are. For abundant evidence that his conditions are contentious, spend 
some time perusing the vast philosophical literature on love.) Even though I think two 
of Frankfurt’s conditions are wrong (viz., II and III), I am more concerned to establish 
that the propositional set is unsatisfiable. 
 
 
3. Self-Love, the Purest Love 
 
Immediately after providing this summary of the four necessary conditions, Frankfurt 
argues that self-love is love and that it “is in a certain way the purest of all modes of 
love” (ROL, 80; emphasis added).17 Frankfurt believes that these claims are the book’s 
most dramatic theses, and he’s right, so his devoting a whole chapter (out of three) to 
“The Dear Self” is thematically justified. His claims that self-love is love and the purest 
mode of love are counterintuitive. He writes, though, that “the exceptional purity of 
self-love can easily be demonstrated” (ROL, 80; emphasis added). That surely is a 
shock. The general outline of Frankfurt’s argument is that “love of oneself is purer than 
other sorts of love because it is in cases of self-love that the love is most likely to be 
unequivocal and unalloyed,” that is, self-love “conform[s] more closely . . . to the 
criteria that identify what loving essentially is.”18 Frankfurt proceeds to explain how 
self-love actually does satisfy his four necessary conditions. I present these 
explanations in Frankfurt’s order, using my numbering. 
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[III] To begin with, it will surely be conceded without too much 
argument that when a person loves himself, the identification of the 
lover with his beloved is distinctively robust and uncurtailed. For 
someone who loves himself, needless to say, his own interests and those 
of his beloved are identical. [ROL, 81] 
 
It is true, needless to say, that the interests of the lover X and the beloved X are the 
same when X loves X (or, for that matter, when X doesn’t love X). But this 
“idempotence” of interests does not count as X’s self-love for X satisfying the 
“identification of interests” condition. (“Will surely be conceded” was conceited.) If X 
loves Y, Frankfurt tells us, X “takes the interests of his beloved as his own” (ROL, 80). 
The key here is “takes.” In loving Y, X does something, and does something unusual: X 
takes on as his or her own interests the interests of some other person. When X loves X 
(and even before X loves X or if X never loves X), the interests are identical, but only 
and exactly because they are already the same interests. There is nothing done here by 
X, and nothing unusual is being done by X. The idea here is that having the same 
interests is not the same thing as taking on additional interests so that the interests of X 
and Y turn out to be the same.19 In self-love, there is nothing for X to take on. That X’s 
interests are X’s interests in self-love does not imply any changes in X’s life, while X’s 
taking on the interests of Y (as X knows) will affect the welfare of X in many ways, both 
positively and negatively (ROL, 61, 80). Frankfurt’s claim that in self-love there is an 
“identification of interests” is false on his own account of taking on interests. If so, self-
love on his account cannot be love, because it lacks one of love’s necessary conditions. 
To express the point another way: “taking on interests” is a process of making interests 
coincide; what is characteristic of love is not a state of identical interests. Earlier in the 
book, Frankfurt described “identification” as a process, not as a state: “[A] lover 
identifies himself with what he loves. . . . The lover is invested in his beloved. . . . To 
the extent that he invests himself in what he loves, and in that way identifies with it, its 
interests are identical with his own” (ROL, 61-62). By contrast, in self-love X’s 
interests are identical with X’s interests, full stop. No task or process of investment and 
identification occur. As a result, Frankfurt is prohibited, on his own account, from 
calling self-love “love.” Hence, of course, self-love cannot be the purest mode of love. 
Frankfurt then turns to the “particularity” condition: 
 
[II] It is even more obvious that someone who loves himself is devoted 
to his beloved as a particular individual rather than as an instance or 
exemplar of some general type. The self-love of a person cannot 
coherently be considered transferable to an equivalent substitute. [ROL, 
81] 
 
I’m willing to grant ex hypothesi this point to Frankfurt (other than “even more 
obvious”), but it does not get us very far in understanding either other-love or self-love. 
That the beloved is a particular makes love incomprehensible; as conceded by 
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Frankfurt, the beloved’s particularity is “mysterious” and “impossible to define.” This 
ineffability might well be taken as a defect of Frankfurt’s account of love (and of any 
other account of love that includes particularity). He writes exuberantly, without a hint 
of distress or doubt, that person X loves another person Y in virtue of “her whole 
lovable nature … that inexplicable quality of which I cannot give an account.”20 
Contemporary philosophers have struggled mightily with “particularity,” “non-
substitutability,” “irreplaceability,” and, the winner in this police lineup (identity 
parade), “haecceity.”21 Frankfurt has not learned anything from them. That an account 
of love rests on the beloved’s ineffability, as if that were posited as a primitive of a 
formalized system, is a strike against it. The view that Frankfurt denies, in which love 
is based on or caused by the previously acknowledged attractive properties of the 
beloved, has no such ontologically suspicious baggage. It has, instead, the more 
tractable task of explaining why X values some properties as good or beautiful and as a 
result tends to love, and shower with disinterested concern, brunettes rather than 
blondes.22 
 
Frankfurt next argues that self-love satisfies the “nonvoluntary” requirement: 
 
[IV] In the third place, self-love is not merely outside our immediate 
voluntary control. We are moved more naturally to love ourselves . . . 
than we are moved to love other things. Moreover, our inclination 
toward self-love is less susceptible than are other modes of loving to 
being effectively inhibited or blocked by indirect influence and 
management. [ROL, 81] 
 
While describing and defending the “nonvoluntary” nature of other-love, Frankfurt 
minimized the extent to which “indirect” and “nonimmediate” influences undermined 
or provided cogent counterexamples to this necessary condition. Now, in trying to 
explain how self-love is pure, he finds that he must convince us that other-love is more 
susceptible to our voluntary decisions and actions than is self-love. Maybe it is true that 
self-love succumbs less to our efforts to control it than do our loves for other people. 
This failure of self-control sometimes leads us into stupidly dangerous yet irresistible 
endeavors: Death in Venice at one tragic end and Charles–Camilla Parker Bowles and 
Bill Clinton–Monica Lewinsky at the other comical end. However, that self-love is 
more pure in this sense seems to make it less a mode of love than other-love. 
 
 
4. Disinterested Concern 
 
Frankfurt saves until last the astonishing claim that not only is self-love a mode of love 
in virtue of including disinterested concern, but also that is it more pure in this way than 
other-love. 
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[IV] Finally, the unalloyed purity of self-love is almost never spoiled by 
the intrusion of any extrinsic or ulterior purpose. . . . In the love that we 
devote to ourselves, the flourishing of the beloved is sought—to a 
greater degree than in other types of love—not only for its own sake but 
for its own sake alone. . . . Indeed, self-love is nearly always entirely 
disinterested, in the clear and literal sense of being motivated by no 
interests other than those of the beloved. [ROL, 82] 
 
This passage, I submit, is a bit of empty word-play. Here is my understanding of 
disinterested concern, which is reminiscent of the views of Aristotle and Kant and 
which seems to be what Frankfurt himself has in mind by “disinterested concern.”23 If 
X loves Y, then X wishes that Y flourish and X acts accordingly to promote Y’s good, 
and X wishes the good for Y for Y’s own sake and not for X’s sake (nor for any other 
sake or “ulterior” purpose). If in this reasonable formula we replace Y with X in order to 
define the purported disinterested concern of self-love, the result is a contradiction: If X 
loves X, then X wishes that X flourish and X acts accordingly to promote X’s good, and 
X wishes the good for X for X’s own sake and not for X’s sake (nor for any other sake 
or “ulterior” purpose). “X wishes the good for X for X’s own sake and not for X’s sake” 
is the obvious contradiction. We could, with Frankfurt, turn the contradiction into an 
advantage and argue that in self-love X promotes X’s good for X’s own sake and not for 
any “ulterior” purpose; here Frankfurt bundles “and not for X’s sake” with “ulterior” 
purposes. But this is to underestimate the point of the crucial phrase “and not” in the 
Aristotelian-Kantian conception of disinterested concern. Without the contrast between 
what X could do for Y for Y’s sake and not for X’s sake and what X could do for Y for 
X’s sake, the notion of disinterested concern disintegrates. No one in the history of the 
philosophy of love would have proposed disinterested concern as an element or 
condition of love unless the contrast implied by “and not” were taken seriously and 
literally. Frankfurt’s claim that self-love is the purest type of love because we can 
eliminate the point of “and not for X’s sake” employs foolish logic to make a mockery 
of this tradition and to promote a perverted misunderstanding of it. 
 
It is in part because love, according to Frankfurt, is immensely important in our lives 
(ROL, 53-55) that it does not matter what or whom we love, as long as we love 
something or another. To the extent that loving per se, loving anything instead of 
nothing, is central to our lives, reasons for loving one person or thing instead of some 
other person or thing are irrelevant (ROL, 51-53). But this value for the lover of love 
per se prompts Frankfurt to notice a problem in his account of love: the tension 
between X’s love for Y having value for X (hence being good for X), and X’s love for Y 
requiring, through disinterested concern, that X qua lover wants the good for Y only for 
Y’s sake (ROL, 60). Frankfurt tries to solve this problem by invoking another necessary 
condition of love, the identification of interests. 
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5. The Identification of Interests 
 
Frankfurt tackles the problem head-on: 
 
The appearance of conflict between pursuing one’s own interests [by 
wanting love in one’s life for the value of love itself] and being 
selflessly devoted to the interests of another is dispelled once we 
appreciate that what serves the self-interest of the lover is nothing other 
than his selflessness. . . . Accordingly, the benefit of loving accrues to a 
person only to the extent that he cares about his beloved disinterestedly. 
[ROL, 61-62] 
 
There is a bit more, but let’s for a minute interrupt Frankfurt’s solution to make the 
point that even if it is granted that love itself has value, it does not follow from the 
importance of love per se that Frankfurt’s type of love, in particular, is important in our 
lives (as opposed to loves that do not conform with all or some of his four necessary 
conditions). Frankfurt does not bother to mention or rebut the view that a love based on 
the superb properties of the beloved may well adequately satisfy our wanting to love 
simpliciter. If so, reasons for loving a specific person become admissible on Frankfurt’s 
own terms. 
 
Frankfurt finishes his argument that the lover’s self-interest in loving is reconciled with 
the lover’s loving his beloved disinterestedly by asserting that 
 
a lover identifies himself  with what he loves. In virtue of this 
identification, protecting the interests of his beloved is necessarily 
among the lover’s own interests. The interests of his beloved are not 
actually other than his at all. 
 
Once Frankfurt has committed himself both to the necessity of disinterested concern 
and the thesis that loving per se is valuable to the lover, he finds himself in a 
predicament. He believes he can extricate himself by appealing to the (dubitable and, as 
I mentioned earlier, not defended) idea that the “identification of interests” is yet 
another necessary condition of love. He supposes that adding identification of interests 
to his account of love gets him off a troublesome hook. No, it doesn’t. What the 
addition does is to make his situation worse, for now Frankfurt’s account of love 
becomes incoherent: disinterested concern and the identification of interests cannot 
both be necessary conditions of love. 
 
I have often heard it said (at banquets, weddings, funerals, or over cocktails) that the 
identification of interests is exactly that element of love which solves problems 
surrounding the care and concern of love. (Frankfurt might have found himself at such 
Princeton gatherings.) If the interests of X and Y are joined together, so that X’s 
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interests are Y’s interests, and vice versa, and as a result their interests are the same, 
then we have managed, despite the protests of all those separated, divorced, or thrice-
married cynics, to exclude selfishness from genuine love. There can be no selfishness in 
love because, interests being the same, there is nothing to be selfish about. If I try 
“selfishly” to increase my good, I must also be increasing your good, and no one has 
grounds for feeling cheated. Perhaps this view is right. But its being right about how 
selfishness is eliminated from love is not something that allows Frankfurt to gloat. For 
if the identification of interests rules out the possibility of selfishness, it also similarly 
rules out the possibility of lovers having disinterested concern for each other. 
 
In disinterested concern, X wishes Y well for Y’s own sake, and not for X's, and X acts 
accordingly to promote specifically Y’s own well-being (a separate thing), not 
necessarily X’s own well-being. If the lovers’ interests become the same, that fusion 
destroys the logical space for both selfishness and disinterested concern. When the 
previously independent interests of X and Y are joined or merged (like the Platonic-
Aristophanic welding together again of the two cut halves), X can no longer promote 
Y’s good for Y’s sake because Y has no good of her own that X could promote. 
Similarly, were X to (try to) sacrifice X’s good for the sake of Y, X could not be 
sacrificing X’s good for Y’s sake, because X no longer has any good of X’s own that X 
could sacrifice.24 Any account of love (for example, an account that includes both 
disinterested concern and the identification of interests as necessary conditions) that 
eliminates the logical possibility of loving, generous self-sacrifice must be wrong. If 
you consider this to be a conclusion reached by mere empty word-play, ask yourself 
whether this word-play is, nonetheless, commendably better, more acceptable, than 
Frankfurt’s word-play.25 
 
 
 
                ___________________________________________ 
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are or might be some “non-main” necessary features. Further, Frankfurt’s phrase “most basically” in [I] 
makes no sense; failing to satisfy any one of the four (“main”) necessary conditions means that the 
phenomenon is not love—logically, all the conditions are equally “basic.” Similarly, Frankfurt writes 
(Reasons of Love, p. 42), “Love is, most centrally, a disinterested concern.” So the other three conditions 
are “less centrally” necessary? 
 
10 Aristotle: “[C]omplete friendship is the friendship of good people similar in virtue; for they wish goods 
in the same way to each other in so far as they are good, and they are good in themselves. [Hence they 
wish goods to each other for each other’s own sake.—Irwin’s interpolation.] Now those who wish goods 
to their friend for the friend’s own sake are friends most of all; for they have this attitude because of the 
friend himself, not coincidentally. . . . Each of them is both good unconditionally and good for his friend, 
since good people are both unconditionally good and advantageous for each other” (Nicomachean Ethics, 
1156b6-1156b14). Kant: “Act in such a way that you always treat humanity, whether in your own person 
or in the person of any other, never simply as a means, but always at the same time as an end.” And: 
“man . . . exists as an end in himself, not merely as a means for arbitrary use by this or that will: he must 
in all his actions, whether they are directed to himself or to other rational beings, always be viewed at the 
same time as an end” (Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals. Trans. H. J. Paton [New York: Harper, 
1964], p. 96 [Ak 429], p. 95 [Ak 428]). 
 
11 See Robert Kraut, “Love De Re,” Midwest Studies in Philosophy 10 (1986), pp. 413-30. 
 
12 On “replaceable” and “substitutable,” see Neera Badhwar, “Friends as Ends in Themselves,” 
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 48:1 (1987), pp. 1-23; Mark Bernstein, “Love, Particularity, 
and Selfhood,” Southern Journal of Philosophy 23 (1986), pp. 287-93; my “Irreplaceability,” in A. 
Soble, ed., Sex, Love, and Friendship (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 1997), pp. 355-57; and my Structure of Love, 
pp. 293-98. 
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13 Versions of the “identification of interests” condition figure into the accounts of love of many 
theologians, philosophers, and psychologists, none of whom Frankfurt mentions. For example, see 
Michel de Montaigne, “Of Friendship,” in The Complete Essays of Montaigne. Trans. D. Frame 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1966), bk. 1, chap. 28; Immanuel Kant, Lectures on Ethics. Trans. 
P. Heath (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), Ak 27:388, pp. 158-59; Robert Nozick, 
“Love’s Bond,” in The Examined Life (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1989), pp. 68-86; and J.F.M. 
Hunter, Thinking about Sex and Love (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1980), pp. 75-76. For a thorough 
discussion of the identification of interests, see my “Union, Autonomy, and Concern,” in Roger Lamb, 
ed., Love Analyzed (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1997), pp. 65-92. 
 
14 Robert Solomon was the major recent proponent of the view that voluntary decisions play an important 
role in love. See The Passions (Garden City, N.Y.: Anchor Press/Doubleday, 1976) and Love: Emotion, 
Myth and Metaphor (Buffalo, N.Y.: Prometheus Books, 1990). 
 
15 For another list of four necessary conditions, which only partially overlaps Frankfurt’s list, see W. 
Newton-Smith, “A Conceptual Investigation of Love,” in A. Montefiore, ed., Philosophy and Personal 
Relations (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1973), pp. 113-36 (reprinted in my Eros, Agape, 
and Philia, pp. 199-217). His four conditions, says Newton-Smith, are only “g-necessary” (generally 
necessary). This maneuver does not improve on Frankfurt’s “most centrally” and “most basically” (see 
above, note 9). 
 
16 The claim is made in her review of Reasons of Love (Ethics 116:1 [2005], pp. 228-34, at p. 231). 
 
17 Frankfurt also claims (Reasons of Love, 43), “Among relationships between humans, the love of 
parents for their infants or small children is the species of caring that comes closest to offering 
recognizably pure instances of love” (emphasis added). The qualification, “between [two or more] 
humans,” eliminates the apparent contradiction concerning which mode of love is, on Frankfurt’s view, 
the purest. Nevertheless, he does think that self-love is more pure than parental love (ibid., 82). 
 
18 It is a non sequitur to argue that case C1 is a purer type of M than is case C2 on the grounds that C1 
satisfies the necessary conditions for M better than C2 does, at least because C2 but not C1 might satisfy 
the as yet unknown sufficient condition(s) for M or another necessary condition. 
 
19 When X loves Y, writes Frankfurt, “his own interests and those of his beloved are identical” (Reasons 
of Love, 81). I think, however, that their interests would be identical only if Y also loved X, i.e., only if 
their love were reciprocal. Frankfurt doesn’t speak to this important subtlety. See Charles Fried, An 
Anatomy of Values (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1970), p. 79. 
 
20 “On Caring,” in Frankfurt’s collection Necessity, Volition, and Love (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1999), pp. 155-80, at p. 170. In the late 16th Century, Montaigne had similarly written: 
“If you press me to tell why I loved him, I feel that this cannot be expressed, except by answering: 
Because it was he, because it was I. Beyond all my understanding, beyond what I can say about this in 
particular, there was I know not what inexplicable and fateful force that was the mediator of this union” 
(“Of Friendship,” Complete Essays, p. 139). Maybe love—like God, infinity, justice, consciousness, non-
effective computability, and psoriasis—is inherently and to its benefit inexplicable. Do not, therefore, 
waste your breath by cautioning us against committing a social science. 
 
21 For example, “[W]hat answers in another to my desire may not be his qualities, but his haecceity” (A. 
W. Price, Love and Friendship in Plato and Aristotle [Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989], p. 13).  
 
22 Now we can commit the social science, along with Freud. 
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23 Reasons of Love, pp. 42, 44, 79, 82. 
 
24 For the complete argument, see my “Union, Autonomy, and Concern.” 
 
25 Before I wrote this essay, conversations with my student Alisa Melekhina helped me clarify my ideas. 
Some of these thoughts arose during class discussion while I was teaching a section of PHIL 255: 
Philosophy of Sex and Love (Winter term, 2009-2010). 
 
 
 
